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Cultural Citizenship Of The Us Politics Essay

Cultural Citizenship Of The Us Politics Essay

Published: 23rd March, 2015 Last Edited: 23rd March, 2015

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Cultural citizenship has been part of a broader discussion on cultural pluralism that began in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Since then pluralism has undergone at least three noteworthy transformations, beginning with, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, attempts to preserve primarily European immigrant cultures vis-à-vis the state, followed by the integrationist civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and lastly, the mainstreaming of "difference" and a multiculturalism that began in the 1980s. Never intended to destabilize the authority of the nation-state or its ideology, these "politics of difference" have helped give voice to American democratic citizenship.

The notion of cultural citizenship brings a greater multicultural emphasis to discourses of race in the United States that stressed black and white dichotomies. It is a theoretical perspective and methodological approach with which to examine the socio-cultural identity, political will, and cultural creation of primarily Latino populations in the United States. Theoretically, the notion acknowledges the cultural resiliency, social reproduction (the class, cultural, and linguistic knowledge and skills that establish the cultural capital of social groups), and rights-claiming agency of ethnic communities and other marginalized groups as viable and worthy outcomes of social injustice and alienation. Methodologically, cultural citizenship requires that social scientists approach their studies from the perspective of subordinate groups in order to understand the latter's goals, perceptions, and purposes. The term appears to have been coined by the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo, who first used it in the late 1980s to make a case for the democratization of institutions of higher education through diversity in the classroom, curricula, decision making, and society at large; a call not unlike that made by Chicano civil rights leaders of a generation before. In the 1980s and 1990s a Latino cohort of social scientists, among them Rosaldo, used the concept to examine Latino civic participation in the voicing, claiming, and negotiating of cultural space. Importantly, these studies speak to cultural phenomena as the aesthetic and force behind the empowerment of groups to civic action. As such, cultural citizenship examines the colloquial meanings of alienation and belonging as they apply to marginalized groups with respect to the national community. In this context, claims to rights made against the state by subordinate communities arise as a consequence of degradation and exclusion in their daily environments but may also result from acts of self-definition, representation, affirmation, sensibility, and aesthetics. Specifically, these may be expressed as desires and aspirations for equality, respect, and dignity. In the early years of the twenty-first century, cultural citizenship has been applied to modernizing efforts in an international context.

Cultural Citizenship - Sociocultural Agents Of Citizenship:

It is clear from the literature on cultural citizenship that cultural phenomena and issues of identity are privileged over theoretical considerations having to do with membership in the polity, except for its emphasis on the group. Unlike traditional concepts of citizenship in which the individual is the rights holder, the agents and subjects of cultural citizenship are undeniably the group. In concert with the literature on cultural pluralism, cultural citizenship too presents rights claiming as the prerogative of the group and, as such, calls attention to an ongoing broader debate between cultural pluralism and universal citizenship in the nation-state.

For much of the studies on Latino cultural citizenship, membership in the nation-state is implicitly ambiguous as if yet to be determined or in the process of becoming, as must be the case for illegal immigrant populations in the nation-state. Others describe a kind of citizenship practiced by Latino communities before the nation-state as "social citizenship," specifically using T. H. Marshal's meaning of social as entitlement to benefits deriving from the largesse of the welfare state. Similarly, social rights to citizenship have been used to describe a "citizenship without consent" practiced by communities of Mexican illegal immigrants in a post national context inclusive of as well as beyond the nation-state.

Group-differentiated citizenship has been criticized on several counts, among them its reverting to premodern ways of using religious, ethnic, or class membership to determine the political status of people; it's discouraging the integration of ethno racial groups into mainstream society; and its undermining of a greater fraternity between all Americans and a common sense of purpose. The historian David Hollinger argues that group-differentiated citizenship is provincial and given to insularity when the need is for cosmopolitanism and "freedom of affiliation" embodied by the exceptional growth (compared with other nations) of mixed-raced people in the United States.

In response, cultural pluralists point out that citizenship rights as originally conceived by the nation's founding fathers are oblivious to the needs and differences of multicultural groups. Indeed, the philosopher Iris M. Young argues, the American liberal concept of equal citizenship plays no part in the notion of universal citizenship, nor is it meant to, since the latter assumes and upholds a homogeneous collective community at the expense and suppression of group difference. For this reason, Juan Gómez-Quiñones believes, Chicano/Latino cultural identity is vital to membership in a political community precisely because citizenship rights and responsibilities do not encompass multicultural rights. "Though there has been a great stress on voting qua voting as a measure of political achievement and influence," he writes, "the act of voting does not promise the achievement of full equities, much less direct and full democracy" (p. 211).

Defenders of differentiated group representation believe that citizenship should recognize and accommodate sociocultural difference to compensate for past injustices. For Young, any conception of equal citizenship must include historically excluded groups in the political community both as individuals and as members of the group. Young questions an ideal that in practice reinforces the power of the privileged in "this unified public" (of universal citizenship) while marginalizing others. An alternative approach to membership in the polity is "differentiated citizenship," which allows for group-based claims or distinct group rights for what Young calls "social-cultural" groups but which the philosopher Will Kymlicka distinguishes as national and ethnic minorities and underrepresented groups. According to Kymlicka, some form of differentiated group rights for the latter comprise part of citizenship rights in most, if not all, modern democracies.

Cultural Citizenship and the Creation of European Identity:

Cultural citizenship is the oxymoron that some American anthropologists use to describe chicano's claims and ideas on citizenship, in certain towns of certain states of the United States (Rosaldo 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). European identity is called a project, or more precisely, a desire of the administration of the European Union, as expressed in texts of European law, court cases and other official sources of news and reports. Hence, the concepts of cultural citizenship and European identity differ in nature, content, context, original data gathering procedure and means to access secondary data.

Distinct realities and words, cultural citizenship and European identity speak the untranslatable languages of their particular circumstances. As logics or styles to address the relations between identity and citizenship, both are positively focused on how differences leading to cultural identities participate in larger political units.

Political and social sciences needs a type of analysis in which they are allowed to deal with identity and citizenship as if they were groundless inventions, discourses and practices in continuous remaking. Social constructionism is an approach that emphasizes the creative as well as the reproductive activity of individuals and collectives. Both cultural citizenship and European identity, though from different angles, advocate for ideas which are not being upheld by the majority. The two of them stress the process of spreading certain values and constructing more suitable institutions. In doing so, both intend to define their communities and, what is more, reposition not only the meaning of being European or American, but also what identity or culture are in themselves.

On the methodological stand, both of them remain public discourses, highly rhetoric. They already appear stripped of context and practical implementation in their original form. Hence, the analysis chooses to follow the conventions of the early stages of qualitative structural analysis. It focuses on the design of the dimensions, which in turn could be used by software of quantitative content analysis as search topics throughout the larger body of texts. Consequently, although the discourses are brought to our attention by different means, the methodological rationale is the same: structural analysis to determine the ideal typical constructs. It equals to part of a semiotic approach common to both the Russian and the French school, also utilized by structuralism anthropology in its analyses of myth, although without any of the original formal notation.

Along the study, the constructs elaborated do not become the ideal of cultural citizenship as a whole nor the only existing European identity.

Moreover, Rosaldo's account of cultural citizenship does not represent all kinds of cultural citizenship in America. In fact, it doesn't even represent all the practices associated with cultural citizenship by the members of the communities studied. The terms and the interest of the comparison rely on its theoretical relevance, not on its representative capacity.

The Latino understanding of cultural citizenship is not the only cultural citizenship available, for it takes part in the larger wave of identity politics, politics of citizenship or group politics. The importance of this politics in America's sociological agenda is conspicuous. Yet it is the opposite of what an European perspective expected in the context of a nation of immigrants, the creature of European political economy, which had a remarkable civil rights decade, and enjoys the status of international superpower. The American performance in the international arena casts the image of a solid political nationalism. From the outside there is but unity and American nationalism. From the inside the discussion is about multiculturalism, any reference to nationalism pointing at a foreign affair. In this regard, coming from the new country that championed citizenship as the bedrock of a nation, the mere presence of cultural citizenship is a discovery in itself that calls for further research.

In addition to this relevance, cultural citizenship and European identity share a creative selection of historical background. There might be no apparent similarities between cultural citizenship in the United States and a Europe that fears "balkanization" and looks at its past as a "phantom" to avoid. But this depends heavily on how the analyst draws the limits of the relevant periods of time, the types of influences he or she is willing to consider and the viewpoint to adopt. Moreover, it doesn't recognize that the discourses and their actors have drawn distinctions of this kind. In the American case the interaction between the Mexican American minority and the Union seems well defined in time and space. Yet this is only the case once the Mexican side is taken for granted as a unit already formed from acculturation of native cultures under the Spanish conquistadors.

European historic background of European identity experiences the same distress. Which past will be on the pedestal? Or if we take the stand as analysts, who side of European roots do we study as influencing most the present strategy of the European Union? We might correctly answer warfare and genocide. The European consciousness is so concerned about escaping from these events that any form of racism or nationalism is now called neonazism. It works as though by resorting to the label we could scare away the feared repetition of the horror. However, well meaning, this categorization fosters the impression that racism and genocide were invented in Europe in the twentieth century. Muslims, Jews, Basques, and Scots, among others, know better. For one, see Netanyahu's thorough research (1995) on the annihilation and expulsion of Jews in XVth century Spain. Furthermore, the situation of Dominicans or Moroccans in Spain, rightist extremism in Southern France or Northern Italy are among outbursts of national ism and racism in Europe that have little to do with the Holocaust and WWII, either in form or historic context. In summary, including historic influences in any study requires making decisions in need of a broader background which is beyond the scope of this paper. This argument is also facilitated by considering all points of history and nations as potentially comparable in regard to ethnic violence and discourses of identity. Dominant and minority discourses on violence and identity are at the roots of all political institutions based on territory, i.e. empires, nations. Similarly, the world system perspective has increased our awareness of the importance of trans-national influences and worldwide processes in shaping national and local phenomena.

1. The Oxymoron of Cultural Citizenship

Rosaldo (1994a) labels the position of Latino communities in San Jose, Los Angeles, New York City and San Antonio and how they conceive of community and their belonging to America as an oxymoron, cultural citizenship. Cultural citizenship designates a corpus of discourse captured by several researchers, mostly by doing fieldwork as participant observers.

Cultural citizenship defends that peoples may continue to be different yet contribute to a participatory democracy. It is a claim to the right to be different and to belong in the nation-state's democratic life. As Rosaldo points out, cultural citizenship is not a theoretical oxymoron, nor an all-or-none issue. "From the point of view of subordinated communities, cultural citizenship offers the possibility of legitimizing demands made in the struggle to enfranchise themselves. These demands can range from legal, political, and economic issues to matters of human dignity, well-being and respect" (Rosaldo 1994a:57). These demands often take the shape of "first-class citizenship", that is, people speak of citizenship by means of a continuum drawn from their everyday conditions.

In this approach, the previously mentioned metaphor of the melting pot is an ideology of coercive assimilation in the national project. The mainstream puts pressure on minorities to make their differences melt into the national community of the nation- state model. This model also bears an ethic that resembles a zero-sum game the gain of one is always matched by a loss by the other. The more identity, language, self-esteem one pays to the minority, the less of the same can go to the mainstream.

Since cultural citizenship is about claiming and expanding rights in the community, it goes hand in hand with a "micro politics that seeks cultural citizenship in one's plural communities - neighborhoods, workplaces, churches and activist groups" (Rosal do 1994a:61). It takes on the struggle of people in subordinated communities. It is left wing in new politics of citizenship, and stands for social change, diversity and institutional reform.

The process of collectives coming forward to participate in everyday democratic life is about creating America. They are not merely imagining it (Rosaldo 1994a). Like Hall and Held (1989), Rosaldo applies the core of cultural citizenship to other social movements and vulnerable minorities: people of color, recent immigrants, women, gays, and lesbians. This leap brings cultural citizenship in line with what has been called the politics of citizenship. However, there are some differences in content and s cope between cultural citizenship and the leftist politics of citizenship proposed by Hall and Held (1989). I shall refer to the Latino case only, so as to remain within the empirical references of cultural citizenship.

2. In Search of European Identity

Beyond the existing icons of Europeanization, there is a circulating idea on the need of consciousness of European identity which is being systematically sponsored by the Administration of the European Union. By means of citations and paraphrases, I shall outline how this discourse works in official texts of the European Union.

With regard to the end and means of having European identity, the texts are highly redundant. A European identity is necessary for the European Union to avoid "fragmentation, chaos and conflict" of every kind (military, social, economic and political) and to help achieve cohesion, solidarity, subsidiary, concentration and cooperation. Almost all potential sources of a European identity are welcome: political and ideological beliefs, economic theory, culture, history, geography, ethnic common destiny, etc. But they all have to be subjectively effective. As Hans Van Den Broek suggests, European identity has to crystallize. That is to say Europeans have to increase the feeling of belonging together, sharing a destiny and so on. Otherwise the threat of dissolution will come from both inside and outside.

There are two typical contexts for the use of the word identity in the treaties that regulate the European Union from which I have rephrased the last paragraph. First, there exists the need for identity at the level of the Union. Such identity has to b e perceived as clear and distinct from both inside and outside. Secondly, there is the need to respect existing national identities of the Member States.

What is widely known as Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, published on July 29, 1992) emphasizes the European identity as a goal to achieve in military defense, based on a common defense, being independent and asserting its identity on the international scene. As the Declaration on Western European Union (WEU) reads, one step of critical importance to build such a "genuine European Security and defense identity" is the progressive merger of Western European Union and European Union, by means of which the WEU would become the "defense component" of the Union (today there are members of the European Union which are not members of the WEU).

Such understanding of defense identity is effective today, as is shown by Mrs. Agnelli's outline of the priorities of Italian Presidency for the first semester of 1996, delivered to the European Parliament on 1/18/96: "External Security. The European Union must assert its external identity by exercising an "irreplaceable" stabilizing influence. " However, the Treaty only links identity to defense. A report on the functioning of the Treaty released on 5/10/95 broadens the meaning to all Union's external dealings "where it will have to bring a genuine European identity to bear".

On the other hand, Article F of the Maastricht Treaty reads "Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States". Taken together, these two aspects (European identity and respect for national identities) set up a segmentary-type model of belongings. It is the same model that Shore (1993) reports having seen pictured by European Administration representatives when asked about the issue. As we shall see, the Union is perfectly aware that such a model deals with a problematic integration. In spite of that, the "hierarchical levels of belonging" tell us that the Union is to get a consciousness and a culture of the same kind of the nations. Only national identity is visible: other sources of a plural culture coming from outside the national id entity (immigration), or below the national level (regions, ethno national minorities, social movements) do not appear to make the selection.

Once this has been settled, the emphasis on the more inclusive set, the European identity, blossoms all over European policies. Many legal or economic harmonization, which could be defended as a matter of justice or equal opportunities are stressed in their consequence of strengthening the European identity. For instance, Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 12/19/95 on protection for citizens on European Union by diplomatic and consular representations reads: "Whereas such common protection arrangements will strengthen the identity of the Union as perceived in third countries; Bearing in mind that the introduction of common protection arrangements for citizens of the Union in third countries will also strengthen the idea of European solidarity as perceived by the citizens in question. " (Italics are mine. Here in after I shall use brackets to insert remarks).

Likewise, when the Commission advocates the insertion of a policy on tourism in the European Union Treaty (Green paper of 6/20/95) it argues that "tourism contributes to promoting a European identity". The Commission Work Program for 1993/94, dated on 2/14/93, addresses the continuation of an "active audiovisual policy designed to promote more extensive cultural exchanges which will accentuate the European identity". The idea of a European audiovisual policy to lay the foundations of European identity is deeply rooted on the Union project since the Single European Act (1986).

Even the minor proposals, such as that of Luxembourg on providing access to European Union Institution Libraries (3/7/95) emphasizes it as "an important contribution (. ) to fostering the spirit of European cohesion and identity in a way which will strengthen the sense of a common European identity amongst all the citizens of the Union".

Returning to more central examples, the progress report on the preparation of 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, released on 9/27/95 echoes that the desired adoption of a European citizenship, as regarded in Maastricht Treaty itself, "is perceived as a threat to national identity in some Member States, and that, unless that perception is corrected, they do not think it appropriate to develop either the content or essence of the concept". Later in the paper, the report will stress the need for spelling out such hostility by preparing "an explanation in clear language which citizens can understand". The report reflects as well on "the possibility of holding a referendum at Union level on certain matters of general interest, as a transparency measure which could also help to strengthen the idea of belonging".

Moreover, the agenda of the Italian Presidency, as reported by the Reuter European Community Report on 12/18/95, includes provisions to boost European identity, such as "to act more effectively and visibly in areas of great symbolic value, which are capable of contributing towards enhancing shared community values (culture, youth, education, tourism, and health care)".

When it comes to reflect directly on what European identity is, the few official texts that deal with such a problematic topic present a circular approach. European identity is both something out there and something that we [European Union Administration] contribute to developing and whose border we [European Union Administration] administer. The official reports on external relations or reviewing applications of new members offer a good deal of information in this regard.

Upon Russian claim to membership of the European Union and on external relations of the Union with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Economic and Social Committee states on 1/26/95: "Under Article O of the Treaty of European Union any "European" state may apply to become a member of the Union. There is of course no clear definition of the word "European". As the Commission rightly says, the expression embraces geographical, historical and cultural elements which contributes to the European identity. It would therefore appear neither possible nor desirable [for the inside] to lay down once and for all the borders of the European Union, which will need to emerge gradually over an extended period of time". A previous Commission report on the Criteria (7/3/ 92) went farther in line with it: "The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor opportune to establish a definition".

Yet, despite a hesitant tone, the Commission put together the European identity and article F of Maastricht Treaty (on democracy and respect to human rights) and reached the following conclusion: "A state which applies for membership must therefore satisfy the three basic conditions of European identity, democratic status, and respect of human rights".

The Commission's evaluation of Sweden's application (7/12/92) is consistent with these criteria and highlights "her important place in European history and culture". More subtle is the Commission's evaluation with Cyprus' application recognizing that i t has "the kind of European identity that suits it to membership", although it would be advisable for this country to reach a "peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the conflict [with Greece]" (cited in Goebel 1995).

In addition to democracy and human rights, by whose selection the European Union matches the traditionally considered political and ideological content of the nation-state project, as in French and American revolution, other endeavors point more directly to economic and even sociological features as solid ground for European identity. In the preparation for the Greek presidency (1/6/94) the Greek Prime Minister said to the Commission "it is vital to bring the Union closer to its citizens and to preserve the European model, namely the right to work and to fair and satisfactory pay".

I find slightly different understandings of identity in Europe in only two isolated cases, yet the second case hastily stresses the defensive responsibility of European Union.

a) The Committee on the Regions (11/16/94) discuss the principle of subsidiarity9 and appeals to the "integration of citizens". Although they address all contemporary concerns of the European Union, the intended addressee is not European identity or the nations. Nor is it the region or the people. The citizen and decentralization (in terms of subsidiary principle) are the goals to attain.

b) A Reflection Group's report (12/5/95) distinguishes between the states, which "continue to be the bodies mainly responsible for ensuring economic and social cohesion" and the need for European integration, which is to protect "our plural identity". Europe faces complexity.

3. Comparing Cultural Citizenship and European Identity Projects

The two projects, cultural citizenship and European identity, differ in various dimensions: content production, political strategy, political rival, political goal, idea of citizenship, idea of cultural identity and relation between citizenship and cultural identity. This section introduces a comparative discussion in terms of each dimension.

CC stands for Cultural Citizenship

EI stands for European Identity

CC: Right to cultural difference and participation in Democracy

EI: Need to combine national identities in a concentric system under a shared global identity

A. Content production

1) Observer 2) Addresse/actor

2) Boundaries, exterior

3) Common heritage, political and technological landmarks in history

G. Relation between citizenship and cultural identity (other than the union's)

CC: culture AND citizenship

EI: culture OR citizenship

A. Content Production

According to Rosaldo (1989), the observer who is to deal with cultural citizenship has to situate him or herself. She or he is inside the system, for there is no outside. On the other hand, in creating the European identity, European Union Administration has split into observed European Union and observing European Union, defining its own content and limits. By means of a self-observation loop, the observer intends to draw a distinction from the outside and describes the needs of the inside as an omniscient observer.

Also, cultural citizenship is built by and for collectives. The subject of both political action and sociological description is the collective with awareness the group raises its voice because the individuals are lacking education, job, housing or dignity and respect. They are not American citizens the way they wanted. The oxymoron is enacted by collectives as much as collectives are the addressee of the oxymoron. Meanwhile, the idea of European identity is targeting the individual. Underneath the states level, the European Union Administration wants the described hierarchy of identities to grow in the voter, citizen, taxpayer, etc.

B. Political Strategy

There are several differences between cultural citizenship and European identity in terms of the political strategy that they deploy in posing their ideas. In both cases the relationship between social sciences and politics is an issue. On both sides, it is easy to follow the commonalities between scientific and political statements; there is a family resemblance between the two of them, a spirit of time. Yet a noteworthy difference remains. Politics and social sciences are interwoven, and have to be explicitly discussed, as cultural citizenship shows and European identity project conceals.

In the position of cultural citizenship, the collective is seen as an activist, the ultimate subject of political action. The people create and negotiate what America is and define their own community. This political activism implies certain micro politics that the collective lives by: demands in neighborhoods, workplaces, church, the mall, etc. It mobilizes every single person in every single space. Distinction between periphery and center is erased.

European identity bears a macro political project: the worth of achieving a wide European identity would be cohesion in the political union. It comes from the administrative center and moves towards the periphery. This project does not aim to make the belonging from scratch. Far from rootless social engineering, the European Union Administration seems to hold the idea of sponsoring an official coming-of-age of the consciousness. Unlike cultural citizenship, European identity does not need political activism on the part of the citizens, but only needs simple awareness of the cultural basis underlying the European Union.

C. Political Rival

The political rival of cultural citizenship is the universalism that dismisses the local and cultural attachment as incompatible with universal values, democracy being one of them. In this view, for the time being, the banner of these values have match ed the interests of only a portion of the society. In the past, universalism has even rendered ethnic minorities invisible in the United States. Elsewhere, it is within this context where any political relation between cultural minorities and citizenship is seen as a resistance to the state. In addition to that rivalry, cultural citizenship intends to remove the actual different classes of citizenship based on economic, educational, and ethnic issues. Inequality affects the exercise of citizenship entitlements.

Conversely, national citizenship as we know it is both reportedly threatened by European identity and reluctant to holding European citizenship. European identity faces its limits when confronting culturalism or particularism at the national level. Ethnic wars in Eastern Europe are a source of concern for the European Union. In that regard, it has been said that some candidates to membership of the European Union from this region should not be "too ethnic", if they seek admission.

D. Political Goal

Cultural citizenship aims to unfold a multicultural state where every minority contributes. In contrast, the European identity project is to turn the emerging super state into a political consensus and a national narrative, in time for it to go through some technical simplifications (currency, languages, military forces, law, etc.). In setting such a goal, the "more of the same" dynamic seems sufficient to face the current problem of European identity -- at the same time maintaining cohesion and identity at the union level while respecting the nations. The European Union applies the same nation state invention to a larger scale. As Johan Galtung highlights, it seems as though they (statesmen) did what they know (building states) the best they can10. Waever and Kelstrup (1993:84) designate this project "to square the European/national circle: make Europe a nation-state of the nation-states Europe".

E. Idea of Citizenship

Cultural citizenship and European identity sustain two types of citizens. In cultural citizenship, citizenship is about political, civil, economic and cultural rights and duties. They are embodied, shaped and spoken from a cultural background to a relational context. European identity is closer to the liberal concept of citizenship: comprised of political and civil rights in the public sphere. The forthcoming European citizen consists of a general holder of economic-related rights in the public sphere 11. The political, cultural and subjective conditions of the people are greatly overlooked. Also overlooked is the relational context and cultural background in which these conditions are created and interpreted.

F. Idea of Cultural Identity

In terms of cultural citizenship, there exists a continuum of differences significant to people. It is a discourse in which there is no concept of "the Other" as a rival cultural group. In principle, a group has no rival in the different groups per se. The opponent is whoever rejects the possibility of the oxymoron -- to be at the same time different in culture and first-class citizens --. In addition to this, the claim to cultural citizenship is pointing to participation in democracy at every level. I t does not emphasize the frontiers of the group, or those of the state, but points to which is common ground for all differences. Moreover, it understands that quotidian life experiences are the source and touchstone of identity. Unlike cultural citizenship, the proposal of European identity does not address how to benefit from national and cultural differences. The emphasis relies on how to overcome them. The main concern is how these identities oppose one another and how they will oppose the idea of European identity. This launching of European identity and the making of its discourse provide a magnificent example of identity and opposition being built simultaneously. It is consistent with this logic to create an enemy from the rivals. The emphasis goes to the political drawing of the boundaries. The making of this cohesive identity appeals to the historical heritage that comes from memorable developments in politics and technology.

G. Relation between Citizenship and Cultural Identity

Cultural citizenship connects culture and citizenship. Its content description shows that it has two aims: first-class citizenship and respect for cultural differences. The idea that these two goals can be attained together without contradiction and without threatening the national unity is simply out of the European identity project. Hence, for the European identity project there is tacitly a choice between culture and citizenship, culture being the local, collective sources of identity at the state level and underneath. In this context, the designed citizenship of the European Union would be a mixture between certain universal values, as forming European identity, and the idea of citizenship described before. The result follows the familiar route: Greece-Rome-Christianity-Renaissance-Western democracy, which has been called the "from Plato to NATO" definition of "Western Civilization" (see Shore 1993:792; 1994).

4. Conclusion for Europe

The comparison between cultural citizenship and European identity sheds new light on the hazards that the European identity project conveys. If there is one thing that cultural citizenship shows it is that there were and still are other ways to square the circle as long as some of the initial assumptions are questioned. Taking the cultural citizenship discourse as an example, differences do not necessarily challenge the union or attempt to segregate13. Citizenship can include local interpretations and cultural forms away from the universalism of disembodied political values. I am aware that cultural citizenship discourse has links to a political background in campus and nation-wide polity, a.k.a. multiculturalism, which I have kept away from my discussion. But we have not studied the praxis of regulations issued by the European Union in the name of European identity project. Nor have we addressed "multicultural" provisions adopted by several states under the supranational al level of the European Union. Both the input and the outcome of this essay deal with the project-making terrain, not with impact-evaluation.

Likewise, the historical context for the launching of European identity does not prescribe its identity or how such European identity is to be promoted. To reconstruct social analysis in the light of situated knowledge, partial perspectives, or positioned observers, under a constructionist approach, I ask what these "descriptions" are or might be doing to society. As distinctions made by observers, I seek both intentions and side-effects or unintended consequences. The supposedly necessary and inevitable aspects of reality have to be temporarily bracketed off in an epoche-like turn.

Should Europeans strengthen the mechanism of the ethno-national border and allow national, economic or legal inequalities to penetrate and shape the idea of a European citizenship? If so, we may face the escalation of nationalism, the reconstruction of tradition by violent means (Giddens 1994), and the grounding of economic and social inequities in cultural and even biological differences (Ferrarotti 1993). Then, should Europeans strengthen the idea of European citizenship based on transnationalism, human rights and constitutional principles, supporting it as the true uniqueness of European historic identity? If so, we might face again the same consequences. The multiculturalist group politics of the American style is not a solution to the European identity puzzle. But in addressing how to deal with citizenship and cultures, it certainly poses the problem in a subtler manner and reaches beyond the segmentary models of belonging.

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